Editors provide a substantive introduction to the history and theories of perfectionism and neutrality, expertly contextualizing the essays and making the collection accessible.

This book taps the best American thinkers to answer the essential American question: How do we sustain our experiment in government of, by, and for the people? Authored by an extraordinary and politically diverse roster of public officials, scholars, and educators, these chapters describe our nation's civic education problem, assess its causes, offer an agenda for reform, and explain the high stakes at risk if we fail.

Do the rich descriptions and narrative shapings of literature provide a valuable resource for readers, writers, philosophers, and everyday people to imagine and confront the ultimate questions of life? Do the human activities of storytelling and complex moral decision-making have a deep connection? What are the moral responsibilities of the artist, critic, and reader? What can religious perspectives—from Catholic to Protestant to Mormon—contribute to literary criticism? Thirty well known contributors reflect on these questions, including iterary theorists Marshall Gregory, James Phelan, (...) and Wayne Booth; philosophers Martha Nussbaum, Richard Hart, and Nina Rosenstand; and authors John Updike, Charles Johnson, Flannery O'Connor, and Bernard Malamud. Divided into four sections, with introductory matter and questions for discussion, this accessible anthology represents the most crucial work today exploring the interdisciplinary connections between literature, religion and philosophy. (shrink)

Responding to volatile criticisms frequently leveled at Leo Strauss and those he influenced, the prominent contributors to this volume demonstrate the profound influence that Strauss and his students have exerted on American liberal democracy and contemporary political thought. By stressing the enduring vitality of classic books and by articulating the theoretical and practical flaws of relativism and historicism, the contributors argue that Strauss and the Straussians have identified fundamental crises of modernity and liberal democracy.

Should engineering ethics be taught? Despite the obvious truism that we all want our students to be moral engineers who practice virtuous professional behavior, I argue, in this article that the question itself obscures several ambiguities that prompt preliminary resolution. Upon clarification of these ambiguities, and an attempt to delineate key issues that make the question a philosophically interesting one, I conclude that engineering ethics not only should not, but cannot, be taught if we understand “teaching engineering ethics” to mean (...) training engineers to be moral individuals (as some advocates seem to have proposed). However, I also conclude that there is a justification to teaching engineering ethics, insofar as we are able to clearly identify the most desirable and efficacious pedagogical approach to the subject area, which I propose to be a case study-based format that utilizes the principle of human cognitive pattern recognition. (shrink)

By a simple revision of Newton's diagram for Proposition 6 of the third edition of the Principia, one can see directly how the mathematics of uniform circular motion have been employed to solve the Kepler problem of elliptical planetary motion in Proposition 11. Newton strove initially to build his dynamics on the linear kinematics of Galileo; and, in this utilization of uniformly accelerated linear motion to solve more complicated problems, he can be seen as revolutionary. But he could not escape (...) completely from the coils of celestial circularity, and in his utilization of uniform circular motion to solve problems of elliptical motion, he can be seen as reactionary. The key to understanding Newton's mature dynamics resides in the discussion of the alternate dynamics ratio, as presented here in section six. (shrink)

Memory exhibits episodic superposition, an analog of the quantum superposition of physical states: Before a cue for a presented or unpresented item is administered on a memory test, the item has the simultaneous potential to occupy all members of a mutually exclusive set of episodic states, though it occupies only one of those states after the cue is administered. This phenomenon can be modeled with a nonadditive probability model called overdistribution (OD), which implements fuzzy-trace theory's distinction between verbatim and gist (...) representations. We show that it can also be modeled based on quantum probability theory. A quantum episodic memory (QEM) model is developed, which is derived from quantum probability theory but also implements the process conceptions of global matching memory models. OD and QEM have different strengths, and the current challenge is to identify contrasting empirical predictions that can be used to pit them against each other. (shrink)

In the 1687 Principia, Newton gave a solution to the direct problem (given the orbit and center of force, find the central force) for a conic-section with a focal center of force (answer: a reciprocal square force) and for a spiral orbit with a polar center of force (answer: a reciprocal cube force). He did not, however, give solutions for the two corresponding inverse problems (given the force and center of force, find the orbit). He gave a cryptic solution to (...) the inverse problem of a reciprocal cube force, but offered no solution for the reciprocal square force. Some take this omission as an indication that Newton could not solve the reciprocal square, for, they ask, why else would he not select this important problem? Others claim that ``it is child's play'' for him, as evidenced by his 1671 catalogue of quadratures (tables of integrals). The answer to that question is obscured for all who attempt to work through Newton's published solution of the reciprocal cube force because it is done in the synthetic geometric style of the 1687 Principia rather than in the analytic algebraic style that Newton employed until 1671. In response to a request from David Gregory in 1694, however, Newton produced an analytic version of the body of the proof, but one which still had a geometric conclusion. Newton's charge is to find both ``the orbit'' and ``the time in orbit.'' In the determination of the dependence of the time on orbital position, t(r), Newton evaluated an integral of the form ∫dx/xn to calculate a finite algebraic equation for the area swept out as a function of the radius, but he did not write out the analytic expression for time t = t(r), even though he knew that the time t is proportional to that area. In the determination of the orbit, θ (r), Newton obtained an integral of the form ∫dx/√(1−x2) for the area that is proportional to the angle θ, an integral he had shown in his 1669 On Analysis by Infinite Equations to be equal to the arcsin(x). Since the solution must therefore contain a transcendental function, he knew that a finite algebraic solution for θ=θ(r) did not exist for ``the orbit'' as it had for ``the time in orbit.'' In contrast to these two solutions for the inverse cube force, however, it is not possible in the inverse square solution to generate a finite algebraic expression for either ``the orbit'' or ``the time in orbit.'' In fact, in Lemma 28, Newton offers a demonstration that the area of an ellipse cannot be given by a finite equation. I claim that the limitation of Lemma 28 forces Newton to reject the inverse square force as an example and to choose instead the reciprocal cube force as his example in Proposition 41. (shrink)

Contrary to the received opinion, the fundamentals of Newton's dynamics can be set forth quite simply. In the first edition of the Principia, Newton employs a device that relates to Galileo's analysis of uniform rectilinear motion. In the second and third editions, Newton introduces an alternate device that relates to Huygens's analysis of uniform circular motion. A third device is also introduced but is hidden away as a corollary to a problem rather than set forth clearly as a theorem. Following (...) the appearance of the first edition, Newton proposed, but never published, a grand new scheme for revising his dynamics in which he clearly set forth each dynamics ratio with a complementary set of solutions to the problems. As published, however, the alternate methods are not clear and are a source more of confusion than of clarification. (shrink)

Despite its importance, the linkage between genetic and cultural evolution has until now been little explored. An understanding of this linkage is needed to extend evolutionary theory so that it can deal for the first time with the phenomena of mind and human social history. We characterize the process of gene-culture coevolution, in which culture is shaped by biological imperatives while biological traits are simultaneously altered by genetic evolution in response to cultural history. A case is made from both theory (...) and evidence that genetic and cultural evolution are inseverable, and that the human mind has tended to evolve so as to bias individuals toward certain patterns of cognition and choice rather than others. With the aid of mathematical models we trace the coevolutionary circuit: The genes prescribe structure in developmental pathways that lay down endocrine and neural systems, imposing regularities in the development of cognition and behavior; these regularities translate upward into holistic patterns of culture, which can be predicted in the form of probability density distributions ; natural selection acts within human history to favor certain epigenetic rules over others; and the selection alters the frequencies of the underlying genes. The effects of genetic and cultural changes reverberate throughout the circuit and are consequently tested with the passage of each life cycle. In addition to modeling gene-culture coevolution, we apply methods from island biogeography and information theory to examine the cultural capacity of the genes, the factors determining the magnitude of cultural diversity, and the possible reasons for the uniqueness of the human achievement. (shrink)

Cognitive control is easy to identify in its effects, but difficult to grasp conceptually. This creates somewhat of a puzzle: Is cognitive control a bona fide process or an epiphenomenon that merely exists in the mind of the observer? The topiCS special edition on cognitive control presents a broad set of perspectives on this issue and helps to clarify central conceptual and empirical challenges confronting the field. Our commentary provides a summary of and critical response to each of the papers.

Research shows that the physician’s personal attributes and social characteristics have a strong association with their end-of-life decision making. Despite efforts to increase patient, family and surrogate input into EOL decision making, research shows the physician’s input to be dominant. Our research finds that physician’s social values, independent of religiosity, have a significant association with physician’s tendency to withhold or withdraw life sustaining, EOL treatments. It is suggested that physicians employ personal social values in their EOL medical coping, because they (...) have to cope with existential dilemmas posed by the mystery of death, and left unresolved by medical decision making mechanisms such as advanced directives and hospital ethics committees. (shrink)

Introduction -- Contending for moral first things : Christian social ethics and postconsensus culture -- Natural law and the Christian tradition -- Natural law and the Protestant prejudice -- Moral law, Christian belief, and social ethics -- Contending for moral first things in ethical and bioethical debates : critical categories, part 1 -- Contending for moral first things in ethical and bioethical debates : critical categories, part 2 -- Ethics, bioethics, and the natural law, a test case : euthanasia yesterday (...) and today -- The natural law and public morality : second thoughts on what is at stake. (shrink)